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Abstract The adoption of aquacultural products has created an imbalance of
market power between catfish producers and a processing sector that exerts a
monopsonistic power in certain regions of the U.S. such as west Alabama.
However, because of the recent changes caused by vertical integration of the
catfish industry, the existence of an oligopolistic power has been identified in
the catfish industry. An empirical model of pricing in the catfish industry was
developed using a theoretical model proposed by Appelbaum. An analysis of
the market structure was conducted to provide estimates of conjectural elas-
ticities over time. Conjectural elasticities were used to construct the oligopoly
power index. Results show some evidence of the existence of oligopolistic
power in the catfish industry that further suggests some degree of price en-
hancement.
Keywords catfish industry, pricing, coiyectural elasticity, oligopoly power
index.
Introduction
Farm-raised catfish has become a large component of the U.S. seafood market.
While processors' sales have steadily increased, from 27.8 million pounds in 1980
to 233.5 million pounds in 1993 (a 741% increase) (USDA), farm price of catfish
has not followed the same path. Farm price has fluctuated during the 1980-93
period. In 1993, farm price of catfish averaged $71.00 per hundred pounds, a 5%
increase from the $67.60 per hundred pounds of 1980. with a low of $55.00 per
hundred pounds in 1982 (USDA). However, real prices have mostly declined over
the given period.
The adoption of aquacultural products by consumers, especially in the south-
ern states of the U.S., has extended the effects of market forces in the catfish
industry. As pointed out by Kinnucan and Sullivan (1986), "a potential problem
facing this emerging industry is an apparent imbalance of market power between
catfish producers and the processing sector." Recently, some changes have been
observed in market conduct due to vertical integration by catfish farmers who
exert a degree of market power. Product quality has improved and fluctuations in
quantity supplied have been reduced (Nyankori. 1991). These changes have likely
led to the existence of oligopolistic power in the catfish industry. However, be-
cause of the market forces in place and because of eventual regulation by federal
and state agencies, no producer nor processor should be ''allowed to raise prices
too fast or to achieve excess profits (Taylor and Kilmer. 1988)." The other issue
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would be that of new entry into the industry. Holloway (1991) studied the effects
of potential entry on the long-run performance of food markets. He considered the
entry problem in a manner that restricts the persistence of strictly positive profits
which were shown to exist in a dynamic setting as suggested by Reynolds (1982).
Recent work have illustrated the uncertainty faced by firms and the implica-
tions of market structure on price determination (Shonkwiler and Pagoulatos,
1980; Schroeter. 1988; Holloway. 1991; Schroeter and Azzam, 1991). The purpose
of this paper is to provide an analysis of the pricing behavior in the U.S. catfish
industry. To achieve the underlined objective, the concept of conjectural variation
is used. A conjectural variation measures how a given firm assumes that the price
will respond to its change in output. Conjectural elasticities along with indexes of
market power derived from the Lerner index are then calculated to conduct the
analysis.
A Summary of the Structure of Catfish Industry
The catfish industry is composed of two main sectors which are the production
and the processing sectors. Feed as the major input for the production sector
constitutes an additional sector to the industry. The complexity of the catfish
industry stems from the difference in market conduct between the production and
processing sectors.
Literature related to market structure at the catfish production level
(Nyankori. 1988; Dillard. 1995; USDA, 1995) have shown the catfish production
sector as competitive. Although the catfish production sector satisfies most of the
conditions for a competitive industry, one exception may be mentioned that might
have caused the industry to depart from perfect competition. As pointed out by
Dillard (1995), the cooperative action of producers through the Mississippi Catfish
Producers Marketing Association and the Catfish Bargaining Association have
had a temporary influence on farm prices, causing a departure from a purely
competitive market.
While the production sector is competitive, the processing sector tends toward
an oligopolistic structure with few firms producing an homogeneous product. The
rivalry that exists between firms in the processing sector, causing such problems
as price wars, has made the catfish depart from the perfect competition scenario.
Theoretical Considerations'
Consider a non-competitive industry composed of k fu-ms producing a homoge-
nous product, >-, using n inputs represented by x = (jc,, . . . , x^). The market
demand is given by:
y = yip, z) (I)
' This section is a summary of the theoretical framework presented by Appelbaum (1982)
and later summarized by Taylor and Kilmer (1988). While this work is not a duplication of
Appelbaum and Taylor and Kilmer's studies, the methodology used follows closely their
framework.Pricing in the Catfish Industry 163
where p is the output price, 2 is a vector of exogenous demand shifters, and dyfdp
Assuming that all firms are price takers in input markets with input price
vector r = (r,, . . . , rj, the cost function of the jth firm can be given by:
c^ = cjfy,, r) (2)
where y is the output of thejth firm.
Two optimization stages are involved in the decision-making process. First, a
firm chooses inputs to minimize the cost of producing a given level of output and
second, it determines the profit maximizing level of output.
The first optimization process is achieved by defining input demand functions.
Input demand functions for the jth firm may be derived from cost functions by
applying the Shephard's Lemma,
y = dc'iy. r)/dr, 7=1 k (3)
where V is the input vector of the jth firm and dc'/dr is a vector of partial deriv-
atives of d with respect to r.
The second optimization process calls fora profit maximization problem of the
jt\\ firm,
max[py - c'V, r)/y = y(p, z)] (4)
where y = S*y=,/ is the industry supply. The optimality condition is obtained by
differentiating (4) with respect to y.
p{\ - e'e) - dc'V. r)/ay (5)
where 6' is the conjectural elasticity of the jth firm such that,
e' = (dy/d/) iy^/y), (6)
and e is the inverse price elasticity of demand such that,
€ = ~(dp/dy)(yfp). (7)
Equation (5) states that the optimal output is achieved when perceived mar-
ginal revenue equals marginal cost. The conjectural elasticity provides an index of
market structure. Comparing equation (5) to models of market structure, one can
define various cases depending upon the value of &'. For example, (!) in case of
perfect competition, & = 0: the firm believes that price will not change due to a
change in output; (2) when dy/dy' = 1, a Coumot behavior prevails and 6' = I
under pure monopoly, y'/y gives the reactions of the rest of the industry to the
given firm's output choice. It can be inferred from the preceding that the value of
Q' is bounded such that 0 ^ &'^ I.
Following Holloway (1991), equation (5) can be modified to show that 6 can be
considered as the "weight" in a convex combination of the average and marginal








Figure 1. Simplified Oligopoly Equilibrium: The Coumot Model. A duopolist in the
Coumot model will set prices of P "with output X" lower than those chosen by a monop-
olist that charges a price of P' with a quantity of X', but higher than those for a firm in
perfect competition that charges a price of P with a quantity of X.
the case of perfect competition depend on average revenues, these decisions
depend on both the average and marginal revenues in cases of oligopoly.
The striped area in Figure 1 increases with the value of 6 and represents the
deadweight loss resulting from noncompetitive behavior. This component of mar-
ket performance is closely related to the value of the conjectural elasticity. In fact,
it follows from equation (5) that inferences about market performance can be
made by taking a monotonic transformation of 6. Such a transformation can lead
to the definition of the Lemer index, which measures the distortion in price that
is attributable to market power. A degree of oligopoly power of the jth firm can
then be defined as:
a'' = \p - dd{y>. T)/d/\/p = (8)
Appelbaum showed that a' is also bounded by zero and one. A generalization of
(8) is carried out to obtain the industry measure of oligopoly power such that.
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where Sj is the share of industry attributable to the jih firm. This measure of
oligopoly power is viewed as a weighted sum of each firm's output share multi-
plied by its oligopoly power index. L is basically a generalization of the Lerner
index.
Because of the non-existence of individual firm data, an aggregate version of
the model can be used to calculate oligopoly power for the "typical" firm. As with
most aggregate models, it is necessary to define certain conditions in order to get
consistent results. In the present case, an aggregated model is obtained by as-
suming that, in equilibrium, all firms have the same marginal cost and perceived
marginal revenue. This leads to assuming that all firms have the same equilibrium
conjectural elasticity. As long as equilibrium exists, the aggregate industry cost
function, c(y, r), enables us to write the aggregate optimality conditions as:
p(l - ec) = dc(y, r)/dy. (10)
where 6 is the equilibrium conjectural elasticity.
Empirical Model
Following Appelbaum (1982) and Taylor and Kilmer (1988), the demand function
facing the catfish industry is specified as a double-log function such that:
inY = a - y]\nip/D + pln(mlD (11)
where Y is the quantity of catfish sold by processors; p is wholesale price of fish;
/ is the CPI used as deflator; and m is per capita income. The constant demand
elasticity is given by -n = 1/e.
The industry cost function is expressed as a generalized Leontief cost function
such that:
c = iJ = L. F, Q (12)
where fry = fcy,; r is input cost; and L is labor, F is feed, and Q is quantity of
catfish, round-weight processed. 8 is allowed to vary over time, reflecting changes
in the economic environment.
The full model for the catfish industry is then given by:
L = 6z.L + brdrf^r^y" +
F = tff + hr^irjr^y^ +
Q = hQQ + hi^QirJr^y'^
inY = a + T\ln[p/r) + plnim/r),
P = {PLLi-L + ^FFTF + ^QifQ + 26pi.(rpr^)"2 +
where 6 is approximated linearly as 9 = Oo + ^O'L + ^/^F + /Q
The model is estimated as a simultaneous non-linear system of equations using
the full information maximum likelihood method. The maximum likelihood esti-
mates are then used to calculate the conjectural elasticities and degree of oligop-166 P.-J. Kouka
oly power. The market structure is identified by conducting a test of sienificance
of e.
The model is estimated using annual aggregate data for the period of 1977-93.
Data on quantity and price offish were obtained from various issues ofthe USDA
"Aquaculture: Situation and Outlook Report." Data for feed price and quantity
were obtained from various issues ofthe USDA "Feed: Situation and Outlook
Report" and from various publications by the Mississippi Extension Service.
Data related to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), labor cost, and income were
obtained from various issues ofthe Business Conditions Digest. Results obtained
by Appelbaum (1980) for the textile, rubber, electrical machinery, and tobacco
mdustries and Taylor and Kilmer (1988) for the celery industry are used as basis
of comparison for the level of oligopolistic power and market structure.
Results and Discussion
Estimated parameters are given in Table I. As is often pointed out, estimating a
non-linear system of equations is tedious and generates considerable output. The
main problem encountered with non-linear systems is to define the starting values
to obtain consistent estimates. In the present case, the model was estimated one
hundred times with different starting values until the estimates became stable and
converged to the same values. Most ofthe estimated parameters were significant


































































Unrestricted versus restricted model
Calculated x^ = 15.39
X'(4).o, = 13.3
* Indicates significance at the 5% level.Pricing in the Catfish Industry 167
As stated by Taylor and Kilmer (1988), the main concern with the use of dual
functions in the estimation process is whether or not results are consistent with
the regularity conditions implied by production theory. Both symmetry and ho-
mogeneity conditions were imposed. Therefore, only monotonicity and concavity
needed to be tested.
Following Appelbaum (1982) and Taylor and Kilmer (1988), monotonicity was
tested by evaluating the estimated input demand functions. The predicted values
obtained from the estimated labor, feed, and quantity offish processed functions
were all positive, indicating that monotonicity was satisfied over the closed set
defined by the data.
By definition, concavity ofthe cost function would be achieved if the Hessian
matrix is negative semi-definite. For the cost function considered in the model, a
sufficient condition for global concavity is that by ^ 0 for all ii^j. This condition
was violated by the values of iy^ in the unrestricted model and b,^ in the restricted
model. However, since these values were small and not statistically significant at
the 5 percent level, it is "safe" not to reject the concavity ofthe cost function.
To identify the market structure, the hypothesis 8 = 0 was tested. A sufficient
condition for 6 = 0 is that a^ = ai^ = a^ = QQ = 0. However, it should be noted
that this condition is sufficient but not necessary. A restricted model where a^ =
flj^ = fl^ = a^ = 0 was then run to complete the test. Results are summarized in
Table 1. The x^ statistics indicates that the hypothesis e = 0 is rejected for the
catfish industry, suggesting a non-competitive market. However, the rejection of
the null hypothesis does not constitute a non-refutable proof of the absence of
competitive pricing behavior. Some other combinations ofthe a/s may cause 6 =
0. The hypothesis tested did not account for such cases.
To measure the degree of competitiveness ofthe catfish industry, information
on the oligopoly power index alone is not sufficient. It is important to know the
demand elasticity in order to determine the degree of competition in the industry.
Since L = 6/11, the deviation from llr\ provides additional information on market
structure. As pointed out by Appelbaum (1980), different demand conditions will
lead to different oligopoly power measures, even if the degree of competition
remain unchanged. The own price elasticity of demand, -q, of - 1.17 indicated an
elastic demand of processed catfish and was statistically significant at the 5%
level. This result is consistent with previous findings (Kinnucan et aL 1988; Zi-
dack et al. 1992).
The estimated conjectural elasticities and oligopoly power for the period of the
study are given in Table 2. The magnitude ofthe conjectural elasticities along with
the oligopoly power indexes and the elastic demand suggest a departure from the
perfect competition market structure. The oligopoly power measures of the cat-
fish industry are higher than those obtained by Appelbaum for the rubber, textile,
and electrical machinery industries, but lower than those obtained for the tobacco
industry. Appelbaum (1980) estimated average oligopoly power indexes of 0.0559,
0.0671, 0.1960, and 0.6508 for the rubber, textile, electrical machinery, and to-
bacco industries, respectively. These results suggested that the rubber and the
textile industries were competitive, while the electrical machinery and the to-
bacco industries were non-competitive. Results reported by Taylor and Kilmer
(1988) showed that the Florida celery market was non-competitive with an aver-
age oligopoly power index of 0.24677, and a low elasticity of demand of -0.42.
Although no strong evidence is provided, some degree of price enhancementP.~J. Kouka
Table 2




































































































St. Error indicates the asymptotic standard errors.
is implied, especially in the early 198O's when the oligopoly power index was
greater than 0.50. This may be attributed to the rapid growth of the catfish indus-
try with a high degree of market concentration. This is coupled with the fact that
only a few of the reporting processing firms handled more than 90 percent of the
total pounds processed in the early I980's (Miller et al. 1981). Although the degree
of concentration may have declined, it has been recently reported that the pro-
cessing sector remains somewhat concentrated, with a four-firm concentration
index ranging between 60-70 percent (Dillard). As suggested by Taylor and
Kilmer (1988) for the Florida celery market, another possible explanation to the
high degree of price enhancement in the early l980's is due to the fact that the
industry was still going through a learning process. As more processors enter the
market and as farmers integrate vertically to fight the "too powerful" processing
sector, the degree of price enhancement tends to stabilize at a lower level, as seen
in recent years. Although results suggest that the catfish industry is oligopolistic,
it is still necessary to prove whether or not conjectural elasticities and oligopoly
power indexes constitute a definitive proof of a departure from perfect competi-
tion. However, from the trends observed with the present results, it may be
possible to anticipate a movement toward a more competitive market.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to determine to what extent price distortion exists
in the catfish industry. The results obtained provide a measure of oligopolisticPricing in the Catfish Industry 169
power that suggests the existence of some degree of price enhancement in the
catfish industry. However, the question of excessive price enhancement still
needs further investigation. While point estimates of the conjectural elasticities
and the oligopoly power indexes were not statistically significant, their mean
values were significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that overall the industry
has behaved as a non-competitive one. Recent trends in the industry and new
entrants may lead to a more competitive structure. Because the pricing behavior
of the industry depends heavily on the structure of supply, efforts should be
directed toward defining cost and production functions that would capture the
impacts of the supply structure to provide a better understanding of catfish market
power.
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